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1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-3707
___________
LEROY COLEY,
Appellant
vs.
CHARLESTON IWAUGWU, Health Services Administrator; HAROLD SLEVIN, M.D.;
PRADIP PATEL, M.D., Clinical Director; TUSHAR PATEL, Assistant Health Services
Administrator; JOHN NASH, Warden (Retired); CHARLES E. SAMUELS, JR., Warden;
DURR, Lieutenant, USPHS, Assistant Health Services Administrator
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 06-cv-03762)
District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
October 24, 2008
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
Opinion filed: December 17, 2008
____________
OPINION
___________
2PER CURIAM.
Leroy Coley appeals pro se from the District Court’s order refusing to
reconsider the dismissal of his complaint.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.
I.
Coley, at all relevant times a federal prisoner, filed a complaint in August
2005 against certain Bureau of Prisons personnel accusing them of providing inadequate
medical care in violation of the Eight Amendment.  In particular, Coley alleges that
defendants were indifferent to a branchial cyst on the right side of his neck, which he first
complained about in January 2001.  Coley’s complaint and exhibits describe a continuing
course of treatment of the cyst over the next five and one-half years.  That course of
treatment included some 31 visits with medical professionals, who provided, among other
things, medication, aspiration, laboratory tests, referrals to outside doctors, chest x-rays,
an MRI, a needle biopsy/laryngoscopy and ultrasound.  Nevertheless, Coley alleges that
this treatment was inadequate because he experienced certain delays and because the cyst
had yet to be removed as a specialist had recommended.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment.  Defendants noted that Coley’s cyst ultimately had been removed in January
2007.  The District Court granted defendants’ motion by order entered August 8, 2007,
       We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The District Court discussed1
both the standards for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and for motions for summary
judgment, but did not specify the basis for its ruling.  With the exception of a stray
reference to the January 2007 removal of Coley’s cyst (which he acknowledged below
and does not dispute), the District Court’s discussion relies solely on the allegations of
Coley’s complaint and the supporting exhibits attached thereto.  We will therefore treat
the District Court’s dismissal of the complaint as one under Rule 12(b)(6).  We review de
novo both dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6), see Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d
224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008), and denials of reconsideration based on issues of law, see Max’s
Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Under Rule 12(b)(6), we must “‘accept all factual allegations as true, construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.’”  Phillips, 515
F.3d at 233 (citation omitted). 
       The District Court also concluded that Coley failed to allege each defendant’s2
specific personal involvement, that defendant Durr is immune from suit, and that the
remaining defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.  In light of our disposition, we
need not reach these issues.  
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and later denied Coley’s timely motion for reconsideration.  Coley appeals.1
II.
The District Court properly construed Coley’s complaint to assert an Eighth
Amendment claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), but concluded that he had failed to state a claim.  We
agree.   Prisoners asserting an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate medical care must2
allege (1) deliberate indifference (2) to a serious medical need.  See Rouse v. Plantier,
182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).  The District Court assumed, as will we, that Coley’s
cyst presented a serious medical need.  Thus, the only issue is whether he stated a claim
that defendants were indifferent to that need.  We agree that he did not.  
4A prison official acts with deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s medical
needs only if he or she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or
safety.”  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  “We have found ‘deliberate
indifference’ in a variety of circumstances, including where the prison official (1) knows
of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but intentionally refuses to provide it; (2)
delays necessary medical treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a
prisoner from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.  We also have found
‘deliberate indifference’ to exist where the prison official persists in a particular course of
treatment ‘in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.’”  Rouse, 182 F.3d at
197 (citations omitted).
In this case, we agree that Coley’s allegations do not raise an inference that
any of the defendants acted with deliberate indifference.  To the contrary, those
allegations reveal that defendants have provided Coley with a regular and recurring
course of treatment.  He may not always have received treatment as quickly as he would
have liked, but he has alleged nothing suggesting that any delays in treatment were the
result of deliberate indifference to his medical needs.  We have construed Coley’s pro se
complaint liberally, but none of his allegations “‘raise[s] a right to relief above the 
       District courts ordinarily must provide an opportunity to amend before dismissing a3
complaint unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.  See Phillips, 515 F.3d at
236.  The District Court neither gave Coley leave to amend nor discussed its reasons for
not doing so.  Given the course of treatment that Coley describes, however, it is clear to
us that any amendment would have been futile.  Our conclusion is confirmed by an
amended complaint that Coley in fact submitted to the District Court (apparently just days
before its ruling), which still fails to allege anything raising an inference that defendants
acted with deliberate indifference.
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speculative level,’” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (citation omitted).  Accordingly, we will
affirm.3
